

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
-----182202 099536 /66

O R 181905Z FEB 77
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9204
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ATHENS 1633
EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, CY, OVIP (CLIFFORD, CLARK M.)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH
UNSYG WALDHEIM

1. CLARK CLIFFORD MET FEBRUARY 17 WITH UN SECRETARY
GENERAL WALDHEIM IN VIENNA TO REVIEW RESULTS OF

WALDHEIM'S MEETING IN NICOSIA LAST WEEKEND WITH CYPRIOT
PRESIDENT MAKARIOS AND TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER DENKTASH.
ALSO PRESENT FOR TWO HOUR BREAKFAST MEETING WERE
NIMETZ, LEDSKY AND TREVERTON.

2. CLIFFORD THANKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR MAKING
TIME AVAILABLE ON HIS BUSY SCHEDULE, AND NOTED HOW
VALUABLE WALDHEIM'S PERSONAL VIEWS WOULD BE TO US
TEAM WHICH WAS JUST BEGINNING TRIP TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.
NUANCES WHICH WALDHEIM COULD PROVIDE OF MEETING
LAST WEEKEND IN NICOSIA WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE.

3. WALDHEIM DESCRIBED MEETING IN NICOSIA IN POSITIVE
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FASHION. WHILE NOTING THAT NO SOLUTION COULD BE
EXPECTED SOON, HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THINGS WERE
MOVING AGAIN. A NEW SPIRIT WAS VISIBLE IN CYPRUS.
BOTH MAKARIOS AND DENKTASH SEEMED INTERESTED IN MAKING
PROGRESS AND WERE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES IN A WAY THAT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE BEFORE.
WALDHEIM SAID MAKARIOS IN PARTICULAR APPEARED ANXIOUS

TO NEGOTIATE, AND WHILE THE VERBAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN DENKTASH AND MAKARIOS HAD BEEN EXTREMELY TOUGHT, THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT MOST OF THEIR LONG FOUR-HOUR MEETING TOGETHER.

4. WALDHEIM THEN REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE BACKGROUND OF EACH OF THE FOUR PRINCIPLES WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED UPON, PRINCIPLES WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR" TO OFFER A BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THE KEY WORD IN THE FIRST PRINCIPLE, ACCORDING TO WALDHEIM, WAS "BI-COMMUNAL". USE OF THIS WORD ALLOWED MAKARIOS TO KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN, ALTHOUGH WALDHEIM CONCEDED THAT DENKTASH HAD MADE IT ADAMANTLY CLEAR THAT NO SOLUTION OTHER THAN A BI-ZONAL ONE WAS POSSIBLE.

5. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN ENDLESS DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND PRINCIPLE WHICH DEALT WITH TERRITORY. THE TURKS HAD REPEATED THEIR EARLIER FIGURE OF 32.8 OR 20 PERCENT. WALDHEIM SAID IT WAS HIS PERSONAL FEELING ON THE BASIS OF THIS AND EARLIER DISCUSSIONS THAT AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 25 AND 27 PERCENT WAS OBTAINABLE. AS FOR THE THIRD POINT, WALDHEIM SAID THAT DENKTASH HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT "FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT" COULD BE NO MORE THAN A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE. THE PHRASE "CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES" IN THIS PRINCIPLE WAS SHORTHAND FOR TURKISH SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. WALDHEIM SAID THERE HAD BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT IN DISCUSSION OF THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE THAT FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CONFIDENTIAL

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DEFENSE AND FINANCE WOULD BE AMONG THOSE POWERS RESERVED TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

6. WALDHEIM SAID THAT WITH RESPECT TO SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, HE HAD IN MIND CONVENING INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS IN VIENNA ON MARCH 30, OR MARCH 31. WALDHEIM WOULD STAY IN VIENNA ONLY FOR THE FIRST FOUR OR FIVE DAYS, AND THEN TURN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER TO AMBASSADOR DE CUELLAR. WALDHEIM SAID HE HOPED THIS NEXT ROUND WOULD LAST FOUR TO FIVE WEEKS, AND THAT A FINAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ATHENS 1633
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SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM COULD BE ACHIEVED BEFORE THE END OF 1977. WALDHEIM CITED TWO REASONS FOR THE "BREAKTHROUGH" WHICH RESULTED IN AGREEMENT TO RESUME THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. THE FIRST WAS GREEK UNDERSTANDING THAT SUPPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS EXPRESSED THROUGH A SUCCESSION OF UN RESOLUTIONS, HAD PROVIDED NO REAL BASIS FOR MOVEMENT TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. THE SECOND REASON WAS TURKISH RECOGNITION THAT DESPITE THEIR POWER ON THE GROUND, NO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION FOR THE NEW TURKISH STATUS ON CYPRUS WAS POSSIBLE WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WALDHEIM SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT ALSO THAT TURKISH DESIRE TO HAVE THE UNITED STATES APPROVE THE US-TURKISH BASE AGREEMENT ALSO HAD PALYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN GETTING ANKARA TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE.

7. SECRETARY CLIFFORD EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION TO WALDHEIM FOR HIS DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS. HE THEN EXPLAINED BRIEFLY THE NATURE OF HIS OWN MISSION TO THE AREA, PUTTING EMPHASIS ON US DESIRE TO BEGIN A RESOLUTION OF THE BILATERAL DIFFICULTIES WE FACED IN
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BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY. HE NOTED THAT OUR REAL INTEREST CENTERED ON THESE BILATERAL SECURITY QUESTIONS THOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THAT CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES IN CYPRUS PREVENTED EARLY PROGRESS IN SOLVING THEM.

8. WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS, CLIFFORD EMPHASIZED US

INTEREST IN HAVING THE UN PLAY A LEADING ROLE. WE WANTED TO CONTRIBUTE IN ANY WAY WE COULD TO THIS UN EFFORT. OUR PREFERENCE WAS TO ADOPT AND MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE. WE FELT THIS WAS NOT ONLY IN OUR INTEREST, BUT ALSO BETTER FOR THE UN AS WELL. IN THIS REGARD, CLIFFORD SAID WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN WALDHEIM'S JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT WE COULD DO TO BE OF HELP IN ASSISTING THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

9. WALDHEIM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS OFFER OF US ASSISTANCE. HE AGREED THAT THE US HAD A VITAL ROLE TO PLAY, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE CONTACTS WE HAVE AND THE INFLUENCE WE CAN EXERT IN ANKARA AND ATHENS. WALDHEIM NOTED THAT US AND UN EFFORTS COULD AND SHOULD BE COMPLIMENTARY. THE KEY TO MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS LAY IN ANKARA, AND IT WAS HERE THAT WALDHEIM THOUGHT WE COULD BE OF MOST ASSISTANCE. THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE WAS CENTRAL FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, AND US INFLUENCE WOULD BE MOST WELCOME IN GETTING THE TURKS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN THIS AREA. WALDHEIM NOTED AT THE SAME TIME THAT THIS COULD NOT COME FROM DIRECT US PRESSURE, SINCE THE TURKS RESISTED ANY FORM OF DIRECT LINKAGE OF THEIR DCA TO CYPRUS.

10. CLIFFORD THANKED WALDHEIM FOR HIS COMMENTS AND NOTED AGAIN THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO TAKE A LEADING ROLE IN CYPRUS OURSELVES, BUT TO CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE INITIATIVE OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM. WE WANTED TO HELP IN ANY WAY WE COULD.
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IN THIS REGARD, CLIFFORD SUGGESTED THAT WALDHEIM PASS TO THE US ANY REQUEST HE HAD FOR OUR ASSISTANCE IN MOVING THE PARTIES CLOSER TO AN AGREEMENT.

11. WALDHEIM THANKED SECRETARY CLIFFORD FOR THIS FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AND THE OFFER OF FUTURE US ASSISTANCE. A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM COULD ONLY COME ABOUT THROUGH THE KIND OF COMPLIMENTARY ACTION BY THE US AND THE UN WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD WORK TOGETHER IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS AS QUICKLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY AS POSSIBLE TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION.
KUBISCH

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977ATHENS01633
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770059-0285
Format: TEL
From: ATHENS
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770229/aaaaazje.tel
Line Count: 222
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 6aae7cc4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3286656
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH UNSYG WALDHEIM
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, CY, UN, (WALDHEIM, KURT), (CLIFFORD, CLARK M)
To: STATE ANKARA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6aae7cc4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009